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Minister, we don't measure our success by 
results, but by activity. And the activity is 
considerable. And productive. These 500 people 
are seriously overworked—the full 
establishment should be 650.  
 




In an influential paper, Hall and Liebman (1998) ask 
if senior corporate executives (CEOs) are really paid 
like bureaucrats, and conclude that they are not. In 
this paper, we ask if senior bureaucrats are really paid 
like bureaucrats, and conclude that they too are not. 
The research literature on corporate CEO 
compensation is dominated by two competing 
explanations for observed pay structures: efficient 
contracting and managerial power.10 The former views 
executive compensation as a mechanism for 
providing CEOs with the optimal set of incentives 
(‘pay-for-performance’), and hence as a solution to 
the underlying agency problem. The latter sees 
executive compensation as the product of rent-
seeking by self-interested and opportunistic CEOs, 
and hence as a symptom of the agency problem. Many 
papers have tested these contrasting positions - see, 
for example, the surveys by Frydman and Jenter 
                                                          
10 For recent discussions on efficient contracting, see Edmans and Gabaix 
(2009) or Murphy (2012). The managerial power view is well summarized 
in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) and Bebchuck and Fried (2004). 
11 As Frydman and Jenter note, both hypotheses find support in the data but 
neither clearly dominates the other. 
(2010), and Murphy (2012).11 
By contrast, very little is known about the 
compensation of senior bureaucrats.12 This almost 
certainly reflects the traditional view of bureaucrats 
as having strong intrinsic motivation and weak 
monetary incentives - see, for example, Prendergast 
(2007). However, public choice theorists (e.g., 
Niskansen, 1975; Mueller, 2003) argue that 
bureaucrats are self-interest maximizers who seek to 
advance their goals by fostering the growth of their 
organization. An implication of this view is that a 
failure to align incentives is likely to result in rent 
extraction by bureaucrats. 
In this paper, we examinine the pay 
arrangements for a sample of high-level bureau-crats: 
the head managers (‘CEOs’) of local government 
agencies in New Zealand (NZ). These agents are 
employed to lead large bureaucratic organizations 
responsible for providing services to, and collecting 
revenue from, city- or district-based communities. 
Analogous to the corporate finance literature, we look 
for evidence of agency considerations (efficient 
contracting or rent extraction) in the remuneration of 
these bureaucracy-CEOs. One difficulty in doing so is 
the lack of an obvious performance measure, akin to 
stock price for corporate CEOs. One possible measure 
is economic growth in the CEO's region; this has 
obvious parallels to stock price (or return-on-assets) 
12 In the only study we are aware of that deals directly with bureaucrat 
remuneration, Johnson and Libecap (1989) examine the salaries of United 
States federal government employees. However, their sample includes a large 
number of junior bureaucrats whose pay dynamics are likely to be quite 
different to those of their superiors. 
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and could be justified on the grounds that it captures 
CEO success in reducing red tape, attracting financial 
and human capital, and fostering a business-friendly 
environment. However, regional economic growth 
almost certainly picks up a number of other factors 
as well, making it a somewhat noisy performance 
measure. 
An alternative measure of performance is the 
quantity of revenue collected by local governments 
from the citizens they administer, i.e., ‘taxes’. This 
has three appealing features. First, revenue 
obligations to governments are clearly of direct 
relevance to citizens, i.e., all else equal, the more they 
pay to government the lower their disposable income 
and hence their utility.13 As a result, revenue 
collection constitutes a natural ‘performance’ 
measure for local government CEOs. Second, the 
amount of revenue collection is at least partly under 
the control of CEOs; although elected representatives 
make the final decision, the spending and financing 
plans they consider are drafted by bureaucrats, who 
therefore set the parameters of the debate. Third, the 
relationship between CEO pay and government 
revenue collection neatly distinguishes between the 
efficient contracting and rent seeking hypotheses: a 
negative relationship is consistent with pay being set 
in a manner that aligns incentives (efficient 
contracting); a positive relationship is suggestive of 
CEO ‘empire-building’ (rent extraction); while no 
relationship would indicate that the bureaucrats in 
our sample are indeed paid like bureaucrats. 
Using 2006-2010 data, we find that bureaucrat 
pay is positively related to the financial burden 
imposed on citizens, i.e., the greater the per-capita 
revenue collected by local government, the greater 
the CEO's pay. One possible explanation for this is 
that greater revenue collection is necessitated by 
activities (e.g., infrastructure improvements) that in-
crease the complexity of the CEO's job. To check this, 
we distinguish between revenue that is used to fund 
additional employment of bureaucracy personnel and 
that used for other purposes, and find that the 
positive link between CEO pay and government 
revenue collection is entirely driven by the former. In 
other words, senior bureaucrats are rewarded not for 
being frugal with taxpayer funds, but for expanding 
the size of the workforce they administer. Moreover, 
higher expenditure on bureaucracy personnel is 
associated with subsequent higher voter turnout in 
local government elections. Since the latter tends to 
indicate incumbent unpopularity (e.g., Niemi et al., 
1999), this suggests that the higher pay extracted by 
CEOs of larger bureaucracies is not due to these 
bureaucracies providing additional services that are 
valued by ratepayers. 
Our analysis extends a growing literature on 
compensation arrangements in non-corporate firms 
and organisations. For example, Di Tella and Fisman 
(2004) and Tuttle and Bumpass (2010) find a positive 
link between politician pay and electorate economic 
performance. Similarly, Cahan et al (2005) estimate a 
positive relationship between CEO pay and 
accounting performance in government-owned 
trading enterprises, but also report evidence of CEO 
entrenchment. In the health sector, Brickley and Van 
                                                          
13 As Di Tella and Fisman (2004) point out, the opposite could be true if 
councils were engaged in a `race to the bottom' competition on local taxes. 
However, Smith (2012) claims that NZ council revenue demands rose by 7% 
a year on average between 2002 and 2011 (compared to annual average 
inflation of 2.8%), so destructive tax competition does not appear to have been 
Horn (2002), Ballantine et al (2008), and Brickley et al 
(2010) report a variety of findings on the links 
between CEO pay, power and performance, with 
evidence suggestive of both efficient contracting and 
rent seeking forces being at work. In academia, Boyle 
(2008) finds that underpayment relative to outside 
opportunities has an adverse effect on research 
performance. 
In the next section, we provide a brief 
description of the NZ local government sector, its 
activities, its legislative underpinnings, and the role 
of the senior bureaucrats that it employs. Section 3 
outlines our hypotheses and the data used to test 
them, while sections 4 and 5 contain our principal 
results. Finally, section 6 offers some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. NEW ZEALAND LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
 
The NZ local government sector consists of two tiers 
of agencies, known as ‘councils’. The first—regional 
councils—are primarily concerned with water rights, 
natural resource management, land use planning, and 
other environmental issues. The second—city or 
district councils—administer core activities such as 
roads and other community infrastructure, public 
transport services, waste collection and disposal, 
natural hazard regulation, libraries, museums, 
reserves and other recreational facilities. The 
difference between city and district councils is 
primarily one of size: a district council can be called 
a city council if it has a population over 50,000, is 
predominantly urban, and is a major centre of activity 
within its region. Title aside, they have exactly the 
same rights and responsibilities. Our focus in this 
paper is on the 73 city and district councils in NZ.14 
City and district councils are governed by the 
Local Government Act of 2002. This defines a 
council's role as enabling democratic local decision-
making and action by, and on behalf of, present and 
future communities. In practice, what this means is 
that each city or district council has a number of 
democratically elected representatives (known as 
councillors) who are supported on a day-to-day basis 
by a permanent bureaucracy. A council can undertake 
both core and commercial activities, and has the right 
to fund these via a combination of property-related 
taxes (known as ‘rates’) on eligible citizens (known as 
‘ratepayers’) and borrowing. 
Each council must have an appointed CEO who 
is responsible for providing direction and advice to 
councillors, implementing councillor decisions, and 
generally ensuring proper, effective and efficient 
management of the council's responsibilities to 
ratepayers. The CEO is, therefore, the council's senior 
bureaucrat. Initial appointment of each CEO is limited 
to a period of five years, after which reappointment 
for the same or shorter term is possible, but only after 
the position has been publicly advertised and all 
applicants properly considered. Remuneration is 
normally the responsibility of a subset of councillors 
who evaluate the CEO on an annual basis and assign 
a commensurate pay package. 
Despite this business-like approach to council 
activities, the exact responsibilities of CEOs to 
a feature of the NZ landscape during the period covered by our sample. 
14 By contrast, there are only 13 regional councils. The much greater 
population base, and the much narrower set of responsibilities, mean that the 
CEOs of these bureaucracies have fundamentally different jobs to the city and 
district council CEOs. 
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ratepayers remain somewhat ambiguous. Birchfield 
(2004) reports one council CEO as claiming that: 
We must be set up to attract (human capital) and 
we need to be competitive and that generally means 
we must keep rates low. 
In other words, ratepayers prefer less revenue 
collection to more, and the ability to do so is a vital 
component of council performance. On the other 
hand, another council CEO quoted by Birchfield 
advocates a different set of priorities: 
Councils aren't just about roads, rates and 
rubbish any more... The issues of social cohesion and 
environmental stewardship are as important 
nowadays as mowing the grass. 
This view implicitly associates councils with the 
performance of more ‘soft’ tasks, which would 
inevitably require the employment of additional 
bureaucrats. This seems to be precisely what has 
occurred. In one celebrated case, questions from a 
local farmer forced a council CEO to admit that staff 
numbers had risen by 54%, and total remuneration by 
138%, between 2005 and 2010.15 The question of 
interest to us is whether or not council CEOs are able 
to use this kind of growth to extract greater personal 
remuneration. 
 
3. HYPOTHESES AND DATA  
 
If council bureaucrats are intrinsically motivated by 
public service concerns, then their interests are 
perfectly aligned with the ratepayers who provide 
their funding and additional  pay incentives are both 
unnecessary and inefficient. In this case, council CEO 
pay should primarily reflect the scale and complexity 
of the position, along with other factors such as cost 
of living. On the other hand, if council bureaucrats are 
motivated by self-interest—money, power, prestige, 
leisure opportunities—then two other possibilities 
arise. First, the councillors responsible for setting 
CEO pay may seek to align the latter's interests with 
those of ratepayers by rewarding actions that 
increase ratepayer wealth. Second, CEOs may simply 
seek the maximum remuneration their personal 
circumstances allow them to command, regardless of 
whether or not this is in ratepayers' interests. 
Each financial year, the council bureaucracy, led 
by the CEO, prepares a financial budget for the year 
ahead, setting out planned expenditures and 
associated financing activities. Although elected 
councillors have final authority for setting this 
budget, the time and information advantages enjoyed 
by bureaucrats ensures that their plan sets the 
agenda for ensuing discussions, and hence is likely to 
be largely adopted. As a result, CEO decisions directly 
affect the economic well-being of ratepayers via 
council revenue demands: all else equal, more 
revenue collection by councils lowers ratepayer 
utility. We measure this financial burden on 
ratepayers as the sum of rates and new long-term 
borrowing (which necessitates higher future rates). If 
council CEOs are rewarded for frugality, then we 
should observe a negative relationship between CEO 
pay and revenue collection. On the other hand, a 
positive relationship between CEO pay and revenue 
collection could be suggestive of rent-seeking: council 
CEOs seek bigger budgets and empires which they 
                                                          
15 See  $6m  wage  bill  queried",  available  at  http://www.stu 
.co.nz/dominion-post/news/local-papers/horowhenua-mail/4088209/6m- 
wage-bill-queried. 
16 See, for example, Fritsche and Marklein (2001), Krystalogianni et al (2004), 
then use to justify greater compensation. 
Council CEO pay may also be efficiently linked 
to the economic performance of the city or district 
they administer. While much of this broader 
performance is determined exogenously, CEOs are 
able to influence local economic activity by 
eliminating unnecessary regulations, reducing red 
tape, encouraging an investment-friendly 
environment, implementing necessary social welfare 
and anti-poverty policies, and making the city or 
district an attractive destination to migrants. Success 
in these areas could be motivated by linking pay to 
outcomes. To examine this idea, we would ideally use 
an income or unemployment per capita series for 
each council area. However, these are only available 
at the city/district level on a 5-yearly basis via the 
national census. Instead, we use a common indicator 
of economic activity that is available annually: new 
car registrations per capita. More buoyant economic 
conditions are typically accompanied by a higher rate 
of new car purchases, so the latter should be a 
reasonable proxy for the former.16 Of course, a 
positive relationship between CEO pay and new car 
registrations could also indicate rent-seeking: CEOs 
attempt to obtain as much compensation as they can 
when ratepayers are most able to afford this  largesse. 
These ideas can be expressed more formally in 
terms of a very simple model, adapted from Di Tella 
and Fisman (2004). Let C denote the CEO's 
remuneration, and assume that 
 
C = F + P (W, L, e) (1) 
 
where F is a constant, W is per-capita wealth, L is the 
per-capita financial obligation imposed on 
ratepayers, and e ≥ 0 is the ‘effort’ exerted by the CEO 
in extracting rents, via empire-building, lobbying, and 
so on. In words, equation (1) states that CEO pay 
equals the sum of a fixed component F (a bureaucratic 
salary) and a ‘premium’ component P that depends on 
the CEO's performance in assisting wealth creation 
and minimizing the financial burden on ratepayers, 
together with the success of any rent-extraction 
efforts. We assume PW ≥ 0, PL ≤0, Pe > 0 (subscripts 
indicate partial derivatives), where P = PW = PL = e = 0 
if the CEO is paid as a bureaucrat. The optimal choice 
of e satisfies: 
𝑃𝑒 =1 (2) 
 
Assuming that there are diminishing returns to 
CEO rent-extraction efforts (Pee < 0) and that such 
efforts are more productive when ratepayers are 
financially comfortable (PeW > 0) and when the council 
has more revenue to distribute (PeL > 0), it follows 















≥≤ 0 (4) 
 
Equations (3) and (4) show that CEO pay is 
increasing in ratepayer wealth for both 
and Rua and Nunes (2005). The OECD also reports car registrations as one of 
its 'main economic indicators'-see http://stats.oecd.org/mei/default.asp?rev=4 
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efficiency and rent extraction reasons, but the 
impact of revenue collection on CEO pay is 
ambiguous due to competing efficiency and 
rent extraction effects. In (3), an increase in 
ratepayer wealth efficiently raises bureaucrat 
remuneration (pay-for-performance), and also 
allows more rent extraction. In (4), by 
contrast, greater revenue collection is 
punished by ratepayers, but at the same time 
creates a bigger resource pool that can be 
expropriated by bureaucrats. 
We investigate these issues empirically by 
estimating regression models of the general 
form: 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑝𝑎𝑦 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖 
𝑖
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗 
𝑗
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗 + 𝜀 (5) 
 
where the control variables are city/district 
population, area (in square  kilometers),  and 
average house price.17 The first two capture the 
scale and complexity of the CEO’s task while 
the last reflects the cost of living. All monetary 
variables are converted to 2005 values using the 
NZ consumer price index.18 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Summary statistics from an unbalanced 2006–2010 panel of 280 annual observations on 69 
New Zealand city and district councils. All variables are measured at the council level. CEO 
pay is remuneration of the council’s CEO; New Cars is the number of new car registrations per 
head of population; Revenue Collection is the sum of rates and new borrowing per head of 
population; Population is the number of people living in the region administered by the council; 
House Price is the average house sale price; Area is the size (in square kilometres) of the region 
administered by the council. All monetary variables are in 2005 NZ dollars. 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Median Maximum Minimum 
Panel A: Pay and Performance Variables 
CEO Pay $214287 $61474 $204284 $419719 $106917 
New Cars 0.011 0.006 0.010 0.051 0.003 
Revenue Collection $851 $358 $789 $3013 $103 
Panel B: Control Variables 
Population 56923 76668 33550 444100 3770 
House Price $267053 $95518 $259538 $559857 $104720 
Area 
3917 4423 2615 30753 22 
 
To estimate equation (5), we collected data on NZ 
councils and CEOs between 2005 and 2010. Data on 
CEO pay and revenue collection appear in council 
annual reports. New car registrations were obtained 
from NZ Transport Agency while population 
estimates and size come from the Statistics NZ 
website.19 Finally, house price data were provided by 
Quotable Value. Our initial sample covers 73 councils 
and six years, yielding a panel of 438 observations. 
However, we lose (i) the 2005 observations due to new 
long-term borrowing being estimated as the annual 
change in long-term debt, and (ii) four councils due to 
one or more variables not being reported in any 
sample year.20 Moreover, not all variables are available 
in every year for the remaining 69 councils. Our final 
sample is an unbalanced panel of 280 observations. 
Table 1 provides some summary statistics for 
this sample. All variables contain considerable cross-
council variation. For example, the typical council 
CEO is paid slightly over $214,000 (consisting of 
salary, bonus, and other benefits such as vehicle and 
phone usage), but this lies within a range of $107,000 
to $420,000. Similarly, annual council revenue 
demands are approximately $850 per person on 
                                                          
17 We also experimented with various CEO characteristics, such 
as gender, tenure, and background (private versus public sector, 
internal versus external appointment). However, none of these 
had any explanatory power for CEO pay, or otherwise affected 
the results. 
18 This series is available from the Reserve Bank of NZ website: 
www.rbnz.govt.nz 
average, but individual councils charge considerably 




Table 2 contains the results we obtain from 
estimating various versions of equation (5). We 
estimate all models in log form, so the coefficient 
estimates have an elasticity interpretation. Column 
(1) includes only the control variables, which together 
explain an impressive 80% of the variation in council 
CEO remuneration. However, while population and 
the cost of living are both economically and 
statistically significant determinants of CEO pay, the 
effect of greater area is indistinguishable from zero—
as it is in all specifications. 
Columns (2) and (3) successively introduce the 
two ‘performance’ variables while column (4) includes 
both of them together. Council CEOs do not appear to 
be rewarded for buoyant economic activity in the 
regions they administer: new car registrations are 
negatively related to CEO pay, albeit not in a 
statistically significant manner.21 By contrast, council 
revenue collection is positively and significantly (at 
19 See www.stats.govt.nz/. 
20 The four omitted councils are Chatham Islands, North Shore, 
Otorohanga, and Papakura. We also omit the Auckland ‘super-
city’ council as this did not come into existence until 2010. 
21 The results are unaffected if local new car registrations are 
measured relative to the national average, or lagged one year. 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 13, Issue 2, Winter 2016, Continued – 2 
 
482 
the 5% level) linked to CEO pay, with an elasticity (in 
column (3)) of 0.067, i.e., a 10% difference in ratepayer 
burden is associated with a 0.67% CEO pay 
differential. Putting this in context, a one standard 
deviation change in revenue collection corresponds to 
an approximately 2.8% pay difference, or $6040, on 
average.22 Column (5) shows that this result is robust 
to the inclusion of period fixed effects. 
One potential problem with these models 
estimated from panel data is the presence of 
significant measurement error in some of the 
explanatory variables. For example, in the borrowing 
component of revenue collection, it is not uncommon 
to see large increases in long-term debt in one year 
followed by equally large reversals in the following 
year; similar year-to-year fluctuations also appear in 
the house price series. We are sceptical about the 
accuracy of such intra-variable volatility and suspect 
at least some of it may be attributable to reporting 
error or small-sample bias. If so, the effects on our 
regression estimates could cut both ways. On the one 
hand, if measurement error in long-term borrowing is 
positively correlated with CEO pay, then the 
estimated coefficient on revenue collection will be 
overstated. On the other hand, measurement error 
noise will understate the precision of that estimate. 
Similar concerns apply to measurement error in the 
house price variable. 
To address this issue, we create a new data set 
that eliminates these year-to-year fluctuations.  
Specifically, for each council we calculate annual 
averages of each variable over the sample period 
(reducing the sample size to 69 observations) and 
then re-estimate equation (5).  Columns (6) and (7) 
report two of these models:  the estimated elasticity 
of CEO pay to ratepayer burden is more than twice as 
large as in the panel data and is much more precisely 
estimated (now significant at the 1% level); a one 
standard deviation difference in ratepayer burden 
now corresponds to an approximately 4.7% pay 
differential, or $9794, on average.23 
The results in Table 2 reveal no evidence of 
council CEOs being rewarded for superior economic 
activity in the regions they administer, but they do 
offer fairly strong evidence of a positive link between 
CEO pay and the financial burden imposed on 
ratepayers. The latter finding has two possible 
explanations. First, it may reflect an ‘efficient’ pay 
structure, in which council CEOs are rewarded for 
acting in ratepayer interests.  For example, the 
additional revenue collection could be used to 
provide services valued by ratepayers.  Or CEOs of 
councils that collect large amounts of revenue may 
have more complex jobs. Second, it may indicate rent 
extraction, with council CEOs engaging in ratepayer-
funded ‘empire building’ as a means of extracting 
greater remuneration. 
To distinguish between these two competing 
explanations, consider the uses to which additional 
ratepayer funding might be put.  On the one hand, 
such funding could be used to  invest  in  additional  
infrastructure,  greater cultural  and  recreational  
opportunities,  and community ‘events’—services 
that are desired by ratepayers and that increase the 
complexity of the CEO’s role. On the other hand, it 
could be used to hire more council employees, 
bulking up the size of the organization controlled by 
the CEO. We therefore split the revenue collection 
variable into two components: the portion used to 
finance expenditure on bureaucrat employment 
(personnel cost) and the rest (other revenue 
collection), both in per-capita terms.24 If the Table 2 
results reflect empire building by council CEOs, then 
the personnel cost variable should be the more 
important determinant of CEO pay. But if additional 
funding is used to provide services desired by 
ratepayers, then we should see CEO pay being more 
closely linked to other revenue collection. 
A crucial assumption implicit in this approach is 
that the hiring of additional bureaucrats is contrary 
to ratepayer interests and not desired by them. But 
this may not be the case. More low-level bureaucrats 
may be welcomed by ratepayers because they result 
in shorter queues in Council offices, yield faster 
responses to enquiries and complaints, and allow the 
provision of more social services. Council CEOs would 
then be efficiently rewarded for providing such 
improvements. 
Consequently, to justify our proposed 
procedure, we require some mechanism for iden- 
tifying the popularity of a bigger council bureaucracy: 
to what extent do ratepayers value the employment 
of additional bureaucrats? In this context, a common 
research finding is that, in western democracies such 
as NZ, voter turnout in elections tends to be 
negatively correlated with incumbent popularity, e.g., 
Carsey (2000), Grofman et al. (1999), Niemi et al. 
(2011). Thus, if the use of public funds to pay for 
large council bureaucracies is on balance unpopular 
with ratepayers, we should observe a positive 
relationship between voter turnout and per-capita 
expenditure on the employment of council 
bureaucrats. On the other hand, if more bureaucrats 
enable the provision of more services valued by, and 






                                                          
22 From Table 1, the standard deviation of revenue collection is 
approximately 42% of its mean. So a one 
standard deviation change in revenue collection changes CEO 
pay by (0.067)x(0.42) = 0.028 on average. Applying this to the 
average CEO pay of $214287 from Table 1 yields a dollar change 
of $6040. 
23 This alternative data set also helps control for possible lagged 
effects. For example, if stronger economic performance (as 
proxied by new car registrations) feeds into CEO pay only with a 
year’s lag, then our contemporaneous panel models will under-
estimate the importance of this relationship. Correspondingly, 
the importance of revenue collection for CEO pay may be over-
stated. However, by impounding any such lags in the data being 
analysed, columns (6) and (7) suggest such concerns are 
unfounded. Separate robustness tests (unreported) that 
explicitly allow for various lagged relationships in our panel 
data confirm this interpretation. 
24Some councils out-source some of their personnel activities, 
leading to an under-statement of true personnel costs. To the 
extent allowed by our sources, we attempt to take account of 
this in constructing the personnel cost variable. Nevertheless, 
some measurement error surely remains, so some caution is 
advisable. 
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Table 2. Bureaucrat Pay and Performance: Regression Results 
 
The dependent variable is the natural log of Council CEO real pay.  All explanatory variables are natural logs 
of those defined in Table 1. Regressions (1)–(5) are estimated from an unbalanced 2006–2010 panel of 280 
annual observations; terms in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the council level. 
Regressions (6)–(7) are estimated from a cross-section based on 2006-10 annual averages of all variables; terms 
in parentheses are White (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. ∗∗(∗) denotes significance at the .01 
(.05) level. 
 



















































































N 280 280 280 280 280 69 69 
Year Fixed Effects No No No No Yes NA NA 
Adjusted R2 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.88 0.89 
F-statistic 366.1∗∗ 275.7∗∗ 289.7∗∗ 233.3∗∗ 151.7∗∗ 124.5∗∗ 99.03∗∗ 
 
Table 3. Bureaucrat Pay and Empire Building 
 
The dependent variable is the natural log of Council CEO real pay. Personnel Cost is the natural log of real 
expenditure on Council personnel (per head of population). Other Revenue Collection is the natural log of the 
per-capita sum of rates and new borrowing minus Personnel Cost. All other variables are described in Table 1. 
Regressions (1), (2) and (4) are estimated from a 2006-10 unbalanced panel of 280 observations; Terms in 
parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the council level. Regressions (3) and (5) are estimated 
from a cross-section based on 2006-10 averages of all variables; terms in parentheses are White (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. ∗∗(∗) denotes significance at the .01 (.05) level. 
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N 280 280 69 280 69 
Year Fixed Effects No Yes NA Yes NA 
Adjusted R2 0.82 0.83 0.89 0.83 0.88 
F-statistic 261.8∗∗ 154.3∗∗ 106.9∗∗ 138.4∗∗ 88.21∗∗ 
 
To determine which of these views is better 
supported by data, we obtained 2010 mayoral 
election turnout figures from the NZ Department of 
Internal Affairs and regressed this on average real 
personnel council costs during the current electoral 
cycle (2008-2010).25 
The estimated relationship is fairly small (every 
$100 increase in per-capita personnel expenditure 
                                                          
25 See: http://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/wpg URLServices-
Local-Elections-Local-Authority-Election-Statistics-
2013?OpenDocument#four 
reduces voter turnout by slightly more than one 
percentage point), but highly statistically significant 
(at the 1% level). That is, voter turnout in NZ council 
elections is positively correlated with the proportion 
of their rates that goes on funding bureaucrat em- 
ployment. While not conclusive, this provides some 
evidence that large council bureaucracies are 
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associated with ‘services’ that are not favoured by 
ratepayers. 
Exploiting this finding, columns (1)-(3) of Table 
3 report the results from decomposing the revenue 
collection variable into its ‘personnel’ and ’other’ 
components, using both the panel (with and without 
year fixed effects) and period average data sets. In 
every specification, the coefficient estimate for the  
‘other’ variable is economically small and statistically 
insignificant. By contrast, the personnel cost 
coefficient estimate is uniformly large and highly 
statistically significant (at the 1% level or better). 
From the panel estimates, a one standard deviation 
difference in personnel cost corresponds to an 
approximately 6.2% ($13296) difference in pay; the 
analogous figure from the period average data is 8.5% 
($17742). Council CEOs seem to be rewarded for the 
size of the organization they are able to create; more 
employees—a bigger ‘empire’—evidently allows CEOs 
to extract additional remuneration from councillors 
and, hence, from ratepayers.26-  
 
5. ALTERNATIVE  INTERPRETATIONS 
 
We wish to be sceptical about the results of the 
previous section. After all, a considerable literature 
emphasizes the strong public service motivations of 
bureaucrats (e.g. Perry and Wise, 1990; Crewson, 
1997; Perry et al, 2010) and their weak financial 
motivations (e.g., Prendergast, 2007). In this section, 
we discuss some other possible interpretations of the 
observed positive relationship between senior 
bureaucrat pay and the size of their organisations. 
One obvious possibility is that the personnel 
cost variable is partly picking up variation in 
ratepayer wealth, and that greater wealth leads to 
higher bureaucrat pay, either via a pay-for-
performance mechanism or because of a desire on the 
part of ratepayers to maintain the CEO’s relative 
wealth position.27 According to this view, more 
bureaucrat employment is not ‘causing’ higher CEO 
pay. Instead, greater ratepayer wealth simultaneously 
leads to (i) greater ratepayer demand for bureaucrat 
services and (ii) a greater willingness of ratepayers to 
offer higher remuneration to council CEOs. 
Consequently, the relationship between CEO pay and 
bureaucracy size is spurious. 
As we have already seen, part (i) of this 
argument is subject to counter-evidence: higher 
spending on bureaucrat personnel is associated with 
higher voter turnout, suggesting that the higher 
spending is not popular. To further, and more 
directly, assess the wealth story, we attempt to 
control for variation in ratepayer wealth by including 
new car registrations as an additional regressor in our 
models. As columns (4) and (5) of Table 3 reveal, this 
has no effect on our previous results: the strength of 
the relationship between CEO pay and bureaucracy 
size is essentially unchanged.  To the extent that new 
car registrations are a reasonable proxy for ratepayer 
wealth, it therefore seems unlikely that our results 
can be attributed to underlying, and unidentified, 
variation in such wealth. 
More generally, the empire-building 
interpretation of our results may be incorrect due to 
endogeneity: it might be that councils which pay their 
                                                          
26 This finding is foreshadowed in the model of Weatherby (1971). 
CEOs a lot also tend to hire lots of lower-level 
bureaucrats. In particular, if our analysis omits a 
variable that is positively related to both CEO pay and 
council personnel cost, then our estimated 
relationship is biased upwards, and we cannot rule 
out the possibility that, within each council, CEO pay 
is actually negatively related to revenue collection 
and personnel cost, i.e., CEOs are rewarded for 
conserving ratepayer money. 
The usual way of dealing with this problem is to 
isolate the within-council relationship by including 
council fixed effects in the regression models. 
Unfortunately, this is infeasible here. First, in models 
that include council area, the inclusion of council 
fixed effects results in perfect collinearity. Second, 
even if the area variable is excluded, the coefficient 
matrix is of less than full rank and hence of little 
value. This reflects the short nature of the time series 
component of our panel: each council appears only 
four times on average, and a sizeable number (17) 
appear three times or less. This is further 
compounded by 12 changes of CEO during the sample 
period. 
A solution to this problem is proposed by 
Wooldridge (2010), who shows that the standard 
fixed effects estimator can be obtained in unbalanced 
panels by including time averages of the explanatory 
variables in either OLS or random effects models. The 
principal results from applying this procedure are 
straightforward. First, the personnel cost coefficient 
estimate is less precisely estimated; for example, in 
the column (1) model of Table 3, the t-statistic is 2.0, 
compared with 4.75 without council fixed effects. 
Second, the economic magnitude of personnel cost is 
unaffected; for example, in the column (1) model of 
Table 3, the coefficient estimate is 0.129, compared 
with 0.115 without council fixed effects. Third, the 
other revenue collection coefficient estimate remains 
economically and statistically indistinguishable from 
zero. Thus, even after allowing for fixed council 
effects, the relationship between senior bureaucrat 
pay and ratepayer financial commitments loads 
entirely, if less precisely, onto the portion of those 
commitments used for the hiring more bureaucrats, 
and none of it loads onto the portion used for other 
purposes. 
An alternative, less formal, method of dealing 
with endogeneity is to examine, for each council, the 
simple bivariate relationship between (i) the change 
in CEO pay over the sample period and (ii) the 
corresponding change in personnel cost. If the 
empire-building interpretation is correct, then (i) and 
(ii) should be predominately of the same sign, i.e., 
within each council, a rise (fall) in real per-capita 
personnel cost over the sample period should be 
associated with a corresponding increase (decrease) 
in real CEO pay. 
This turns out to be the case: of the 45 councils 
that had a CEO serve at least three consecutive years 
during the sample period, 41 saw personnel cost and 
CEO pay move in the same direction. Moreover, as can 
be seen in Figure 1, bigger increases in personnel cost 
are, on average, associated with bigger increases in 
CEO pay. 
Both this informal analysis and the formal 
Wooldridge (2010) test suggest that our primary 
results are not solely due to endogeneity problems. 
27 See Di Tella and Fisman (2004) for more discussion of this 
‘Position’ hypothesis. 
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But nor do they definitively preclude the possibility 
that these results are the result of phenomena 
unrelated to empire building. For example, they may 
simply reflect the influence of some underlying 
variable that increases ratepayer demand for council-
provided services, with CEOs then being rewarded for 
meeting this demand. However, such arguments run 
into the problem of having to explain why the 
remuneration rewards appear to be solely for hiring 
more bureaucrats, and not, for example, for providing 
more infrastructure services, or organising more 
community events. It is by no means easy to imagine 
a variable that could rationally induce ratepayers to 
reward council CEOs for employing more bureaucrats 
but not at the same time also induce greater rewards 
for providing other highly-valued services. 
 
Figure 1. 2006-10 changes. Scatterplot of change in real CEO pay and change in real personnel cost per head 
of population between 2006 and 2010 for the 45 councils that had a CEO serving at least three consecutive 
years during that period. The solid line represents the OLS regression fit. 
 
 
6. CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
 
Are bureaucrats actually paid in the manner 
traditionally associated with their position? Our 
sample of senior bureaucrats from NZ local 
government organisations suggests not. Instead, they 
appear to be rewarded for expanding the size of the 
organisations they manage. While we cannot 
definitively rule out the possibility that this indicates 
efficient compensation of CEOs who provide more 
and better ratepayer services, or face greater job 
complexity, the balance of our evidence is more 
consistent with the idea that the senior bureaucrats 
in our sample are, on average, rewarded for ‘empire-
building’. 
Such a conclusion is unlikely to surprise many 
public choice researchers, but it provides empirical 
evidence where none previously existed. However, we 
have really only scratched the surface of the 
complexities of bureaucrat compensation; a number 
of questions remain. How, for example, does the use 
of compensation consultants affect pay outcomes, 
and does this mitigate or exacerbate any empire 
building tendencies? Do pay structures reflect the 
dominant political affiliation within the government?  
Does the uncertain tenure of their paymasters 
(politicians) allow bureaucrats to become entrenched 
more easily than their private sector counterparts? 
Answers to these and many other questions will help 
to elevate our understanding of bureaucrat pay to the 
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